Abstract. Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family of feasible coalitions, that describes which coalitions can negotiate in the game. We study a model of cooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to a partition system. First, we study a recursive procedure for computing the Hart and Mas-Colell potential of these games and we develop the relation between the dividends of Harsanyi in the restricted game and the worths in the original game. The properties of partition convex geometries are used to obtain formulas for the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game v L , in terms of the original game v. Finally, we consider the Owen multilinear extension for the restricted game.
Cooperation structure
A cooperative game is a pair NY v, where N is a ®nite set and v X 2 N 3 R, is a function with vj 0. The elements of N f1Y 2Y F F F Y ng are called players, the subsets S e 2 N coalitions and vS is the worth of S. By q N we denote the set of all games NY v. We will use a shorthand notation and write S i for the set S fig, and S ni for S nfig. The Shapley value for the player i e N is de®ned by where n jNjY s jSj. This value is an average of marginal contributions vS À vS ni of a player i to all possible coalitions S e 2 N nfjg. In this value, the sets S of di¨erent size get di¨erent weight. Dubey and Shapley [3] suggested the following Banzhaf value, In cooperative game theory it is generally assumed that the whole group of players decides to cooperate. However, the classical model seems to be inappropriate in modelling certain situations. So, the hypothesis of the Shapley value (the probability of a coalition depend on its size, with the total probability of each size being the same) or the Banzhaf value (all coalitions are equally possible) maybe unrealistic. Because of this, Myerson [11, p. 444] proposed:`t he term cooperation structure to refer to any mathematical structure that describes which coalitions (within the set of all 2 n À 1 possible coalitions) can negotiate or coordinate e¨ectively in coalition game''.
Myerson [9] introduced the graph-restricted games and the Myerson value. These games and this value were also investigated in Owen [14] , who obtained a formula for computing the dividends in restricted games, where the graph is a tree. Borm, Owen and Tijs [1] de®ned the position value for communication situations and provided a new axiomatic characterization of the Myerson value.
In this paper, a general cooperation structure is considered, which is an extension of the graph-restricted games. A set system on a ®nite ground set N is a pair NY F, with F t 2 N . The sets belonging to F are called feasible coalitions. For any S t N, maximal feasible subsets of S are called components of S.
De®nition 1.
A partition system is a pair NY F satisfying the following properties:
(P1) j e F, and fig e F for every i e N.
(P2) For all S t N, the components of S, denoted by S fT 1 Y F F F Y T p g, form a partition of S.
Proposition 1. A set system NY F which satis®es property P1 is a partition system if and only if F e F, G e F and F G H j imply F G e F.
Proof: Suppose F G f F for some pair fF Y Gg r F with F G H j. Then, there exist two components fT 1 Y T 2 g of F G, such that T 1 u F and T 2 u G. Hence, T 1 T 2 u F G H j, which contradicts property (P2). Conversely, if NY F satis®es property (P1), then S T i e S fig for every S t N. Let S fT 1 Y F F F Y T p g be the family of components of S. If S is not a partition of S, then T i T j H j, and hence T i T j e F, which contradicts the maximality of T i and T j . r Example 1: The following collections of subsets of N, given by F fjY f1gY F F F Y fngg, and F 2 N , are the minimal and maximal partition systems.
Example 2: In a sequencing situation there is a queue, consisting of n customers waiting to be served at a counter. Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs [2] introduced sequencing games NY v, de®ned by vS X fvTjT e S g, where vT is equal to the maximal cost savings the coalition can obtain by rearranging their positions in the queue. The components of S are the maximal intervals of S in a total order on N. If NY v is a sequencing game then NY is a chain and the collection F fT t NjT is an interval ofNg, is a partition system.
Example 3:
A communication situation is a triple NY GY v, where NY v is a game and G NY E is a graph. This concept was ®rst introduced by Myerson [9] , and investigated by Owen [14] and Borm, Owen and Tijs [1] . In this model, the set system F fS t NjSY ES is a connected subgraph of GgY is a partition system. Example 4: A hypergraph communication situation is a triple NY HY v, where NY v is a game and H t 2 N is a hypergraph. The idea of modelling communication by means of conferences H e H is due to Myerson [10] . The collection of the interaction sets (see van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs [13] ) plus the empty set, is a concept equivalent to that of partition system.
Restricted games
Let NY F be a partition system. The F-restricted game associated to NY v is the game NY v F , de®ned by
where S is the collection of the components of S t N. If S e F then v F S vS.
Note that if the partition system NY F is de®ned by a communication situation, the restricted game is called a graph-restricted game. The map
Values and potential of games with cooperation structure Remark 1: If F is the partition system of Example 3, then the game v F is a q-component additive game which are studied by Potters and Reijnierse [16] .
Unanimity games are considered. For any T t NY T H j,
is called the T-unanimity game. Every game is a linear combination of unanimity games,
Following Harsanyi [6] , we shall call h T v the dividend of T in the game v. The linearity implies that
where the game u
&
Owen [14, Theorems 2 and 3], gave the following result: The unanimity games u T , where T is connected in the graph G, form a basis of the graphrestricted games. We shall obtain a similar property for partition systems. Theorem 1. If NY F is a partition system then the unanimity games fu T jT e FY T H jg form a basis of the vector space fNY v F jv e q N g, i.e.,
Proof: Every game NY v F is uniquely determined by the values fvSjS e FY S H jg. Then, the vector space of these games will be identi®ed with R jFjÀ1 . The unanimity game u F T u T if and only if T e F, hence the subset fu T jT e FY T H jg contains jFj À 1 games of the type v F and it is lineary independent. Therefore, it is a basis. r
Hart and Mas-Colell potential for restricted games
The potential function for cooperative games was de®ned by Hart and MasColell [7] . Given a game NY v and a coalition S t N, the subgame SY v is obtained by restricting v to 2 S . Let q denote the set of all games. The potential is a function P X q 3 R which assigns to each game NY v a real number PNY v and satis®es the following equations
Moreover, the marginal contribution of a player i coincides with the Shapley value:
There are two explicit formulas for the potential (see [7, Prop. 1 and 2]),
The recursive procedure de®ned by the formula (4) implies an algorithm for computing PNY v F . A new algorithm, in terms of v, is stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. The restricted potential PNY v
F satis®es: This implies that
Convex geometries
Convex geometries are a combinatorial abstraction of convex sets introduced by Edelman and Jamison [4] .
De®nition 3. The ®nite set system NY L is a convex geometry on N if it satis®es the properties:
If C e L and C H N, then there exists j e N nC such that C j e L.
Property (C2) implies that intersections of feasible coalitions should also be feasible, since the players agree on a pro®le of cooperation. In the model of conference structures by Myerson [10] , two players are connected if they can be coordinated by meeting in separate conferences which have some members in common to serve as intermediaries. In our model, the coalitions of intermediaries are in the cooperation structure.
A maximal chain of L t 2 N is an ordered collection of convex sets that is not contained in any larger chain. From property (C3) and by induction, Edelman and Jamison [4] showed that every maximal chain contains n 1 convex sets j S 0 r S 1 r Á Á Á r S nÀ1 r S n NY and the cardinal jS k j k, for all k 0Y 1Y F F F Y n. Thus, the hierarchical situations by Moulin [8] , when users pay their incremental costs according to an ordering of N, can be modeled by convex geometries.
For any subset S of N we de®ne the closure of S, denoted by S, to be
The map À X 2 N 3 2 N is a closure operator [18, p. 159] , with the additional condition that j j. The subsets in the collection L or, equivalently, those subsets of N such that S S, will be called convex sets. Every convex geometry NY L satis®es the anti-exchange property (see Edelman and Jamison [4] ),
This property is a combinatorial abstraction of the convex closure in Euclidean spaces. That is, in Figure 1 , the points x and y are not in the convex hull of the set S. If y is in convS x then x is outside convS y.
The set of extreme points of C is denoted by exC. The convex geometries are the abstract closure spaces satisfying the ®nite Minkowski-Krein-Milman property: Every convex set is the closure of its extreme points.
De®nition 4.
A partition convex geometry is a convex geometry NY L which satis®es properties (P1) and (P2).
In the following it will be neccesary several concepts of graph theory. A graph G NY E is connected if any two vertices can be joined by a path. A maximal connected subgraph of G is a component of G. A cutvertex is a vertex whose removal increases the number of components, and a bridge is an edge with the same property. A graph is 2-connected if it is connected, has at least 3 vertices and contains no cutvertex. A subgraph B of a graph G is a block of G if either B is a bridge or else it is a maximal 2-connected subgraph of G.
A graph G is a block graph if every block is a complete graph. The block graphs are called cycle-complete graphs in van den Nouweland and Borm [12] . If G is a disjoint union of trees, then G is a block graph. Jamison [4, Th. 3.7] showed: G NY E is a connected block graph if and only if the collection of subsets of N which induce connected subgraphs is a convex geometry.
Example 5: Let G NY E be a connected block graph. In this situation, the family L fS t NjSY ES is a connected subgraph of GgY is a partition convex geometry.
Example 6: A subset S of a poset PY is convex whenever a e SY b e S and a b imply aY b t S. The convex subsets of any poset P form a closure system which is denoted by C o P. If C e C o P then exC is the union of the maximal and minimal elements of C. Moreover, C o P is a convex geometry. Edelman [5] studied voting games such that the feasible coalitions are the convex sets of C o P, where P is the chain de®ned by the policy order (see Figure 2) . 
Next, this formula is extended to the case when the graph is a connected block graph. Indeed, the formula holds in every partition convex geometry and can be showed by means of the Minkowski-Krein-Milman property.
Proposition 2. Let NY L be a partition convex geometry and let NY v be a game. The dividends of S e L in the restricted game v L are
We claim that u L T u T for every nonempty coalition T t N. To verify this claim, consider the following equivalent conditions for all S t N:
Then, the coe½cients satisfy
Next, we show that for all S e L, fT t NjT Sg fT t NjexS t T t SgX Let T t N be such that T S. Then, T t T S, and S e L. But since every convex set is the closure of its extreme points, the set exS is a minimal subset of S such that exS S, hence exS t T t S. Conversely, if exS t T t S, we obtain S exS t T t S S. r
The relation between the dividends of Harsanyi in the restricted game v L and the worths in the original game v is given by the next result. 
The partition convex geometry is a lattice and its Mo È bius function is computed in [4, Th. 4 We know that fT e LjS nT t exSg S À Y S and so, we obtain the formula for the dividends. r
The Shapley and Banzhaf values
Let NY L be a partition convex geometry and let NY v be a game. The Shapley value for the player i in the restricted game v L is given by p i NY v L , for all i e N. The Banzhaf value for the player i in the game v L is given by 
Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
Edelman and Jamison [4, Th. 4.2] proved that if NY L is a convex geometry and S e L, then the interval S À Y S fC e LjS À t C t Sg is a Boolean algebra, where S À S nexS. Then, S À Y S is isomorphic to 2 exS . Now, the interval TY T is considered, where T e L and T fi e NjT i e Lg.
Proposition 4. Let NY L be a partition convex geometry. Then we have:
Proof: (a) Since the interval TY T fS e LjT t S t T g is isomorphic to subsets of
T
nT fj e N nTjT j e LgY the result is obtained.
In the next theorem two explicit formulas, in terms of v, for the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game v L , are proved. We need the following lemma. Lemma 1. The NY L be a partition convex geometry and let T e LY T H j. Then, fS e LjT e S À Y Sg TY T X Proof: We ®rst show that if S e L and S À t T t S, then S e TY T . Since T t S it is su½cient to prove that S nT t T nT f j e N nTjT j e Lg. For any j e S nTY T j e S À Y S and we know that the interval is a Boolean algebra. This implies that T j e L.
Conversely, suppose S e TY T . Then by Proposition 4(a) we have S e L. We shall show that S nT t exS, i.e., S À t T t S. Since TY T is a Boolean algebra, we have that j e S nT implies S n j e TY T and hence S n j e L. Therefore j e exS. r Theorem 3. Let NY L be a partition convex geometry and let NY v be a game. If it is considered the following collections, 
where t jTj, and t jT j.
Proof: (a) By Theorem 1, we know that h S v L 0 unless S e L. We use the formula (5) and Proposition 3 for computing
Reversing the order of summation, we obtain
We apply Lemma 1 to the term in brackets, and denote s jSj and t jTj. Thus First, the case i e T is considered. The interval TY T is a Boolean algebra, hence the summation index is fS e 2 N jT t S t T g. We consider S T R, where R S nT and r jRj. Then, 
Next, assume that i f T, hence the index is fS e LjT i t S t T g. Then i e T and T T fj f TjT j e Lg implies that T i e L. Now, the previous result yields (T iY T is a Boolean algebra):
Inserting the coe½cients, we have
For any T e L i , if i e exT and T ni T , then T e L i , hence T ni e L and c i T ni Àc i T. Consequently, its contribution to the sum is c i TvT À vT ni. If T e L i nL i , then its term of the sum is c i TvT. Finally, for any T e L with i f T and T i e L, such that T H T i , i.e., T e L c i , the coe½cients c i T and Àc i T i are di¨erents. Therefore, its contribution is c i TvT (where i f T implies c i T`0).
(b) The proof of the formula of the Banzhaf value is similar to the proof of (a). The only di¨erence is that the coe½cients are:
Notice that if L 2 N , then exT T, and T N for every T e L. Thus, the formulas of Theorem 3 are equals to the Shapley (1) and Banzhaf (2) values. Moreover, the equation (6) is equal to the equation of Shapley (see reprint in [17, p. 35] ). The formulas for computing these values can be further simpli®ed when the player is a extreme point of N. Before doing so, we will need a lemma.
Lemma 2. Let NY L be a partition convex geometry. If i e exN, then we obtain fT e L i jTj 2g fT e L i jTj 2gX
Proof: If T e L i , then T ni T N ni e L and so i e exT. For all T e L i with jTj 2, note that T e L i D T ni T . We prove that these sets are equals.
First, if j e T , with j f T then T ni j N ni T j e L. Hence, we stated that j e T ni . Conversely, take j e T ni
. If j i we obtain the result and if j H i, observe that T ni j T T ni H j because jTj 2. Then, by Proposition 1, T ni j T T j e L, and so j e T . r Theorem 4. Let NY L be a partition convex geometry and let NY v be a game such that vfig 0 for all i e N. If i e exN, then the values for the player i in The cooperation structure de®ned in Example 6 is considered. Thus, NY is a chain with 1`2`3`4 and the partition convex geometry is L fjY f1gY f2gY f3gY f4gY f1Y 2gY f2Y 3gY f3Y 4gY f1Y 2Y 3gY f2Y 3Y 4gY NgX
The collection of coalitions which are both winning and convex is W L ff1Y 2gY f1Y 2Y 3gY f2Y 3Y 4gY NgX 
Owen multilinear extension
The multilinear extension (MLE) of the game NY v is the function of n real variables (see Owen [15] 
